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Modern production processes are heavily reliant on industrial 
control systems (ICS) to help automate large-scale facilities. The 
security of these systems is paramount as evidenced by high 
profile attacks such as those against Iran’s nuclear facilities and 
the Ukrainian Power Grid. Existing research has largely focused 
on technical measures against such attacks and little attention has 
been given to the security challenges and complexities arising 
from non-technical factors. For instance, cyber security workers 
need to maintain security whilst satisfying the demands of varied 
stakeholders such as managers, control engineers, enterprise IT 
personnel and field site operators. Existing ICS models, such as 
the Purdue model, tend to abstract away such complexities. In this 
paper, we report on initial findings from interviews with 25 
industry operatives in the UK and Italy. Our analysis shows that 
the varying demands of various stakeholders in an ICS represent 
many complexities that we term grey area. Security workers often 
play the role of shadow warriors tackling the competing and 
complex demands in these grey areas while protecting themselves, 
their integrity and credibility.  
1. INTRODUCTION 
The geographic distribution of organisations is continuing to 
increase as improvements to both global infrastructure and IT 
systems enable new ways of working. Organisations are complex 
and traditionally follow a hierarchical model, from the shop floor 
through to CEO [1]. For many years, the industrial control 
systems (ICS) sector has doggedly followed this vision of 
organisational structure by adapting the Purdue model [2] as a 
basis for ICS security architectures (cf. Fig. 1). However, such 
models hide essential complexity arising from the interactions 
across the various layers that are a consequence of increasing 
inter-connectivity between the enterprise zone and the 
manufacturing zone. Such inter-connectivity has been exploited in 
a range of high profile attacks such as Stuxnet [17], German Steel 
Mill [18] and the Ukrainian Power Grid [19] where attackers 
pivoted from enterprise IT systems to critical control systems.  
Existing security research has studied potential attack vectors [22] 
as a means to detect intrusions into ICS, e.g., [23, 24, 25]. Whilst 
research has focused on the role of human factors in ICS security, 
e.g., [3, 26], there is little work on understanding the complexities 
faced by security workers – arising from the demands of varied 
stakeholders such as managers, control engineers, enterprise IT 
personnel and field site operators.  
 
 
Fig. 1: The Purdue Reference Architecture for ICS [21] 
This paper addresses this gap by reporting initial findings from a 
study of 25 industry workers in the UK and Italy. Our study 
highlights that ICS security is a grey area shaped by the often 
competing demands of a variety of stakeholders, e.g., managers, 
control engineers, enterprise IT personnel and field site operators. 
Security workers are the shadow warriors working continuously 
to address unexpected situations arising from the technologies in 
use, the supply chain as well as employees in different parts of the 
organisation. Their tasks are poorly understood by others in the 
organisation – other workers have to manage “real” things, like 
documents, or common production machineries and meet to 
prepare future product launches, address safety issues, and deal 
with countless other well-defined tasks. Against this backdrop, 
cyber security emerges as a relatively nebulous and intangible 
undertaking, not easily grasped by those who are not directly 
responsible for it. Security workers must, therefore, utilise 
disciplinary protocols, and rely on power delegated by the 
management. However, this often leads to lack of cooperation 
from other parts of the organisation. Security workers, therefore, 
don the role of shadow warriors tackling the competing and 
complex demands in these grey areas while protecting themselves, 
their integrity and credibility. 
The novel contributions of this paper are as follows: 
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• We present insights into the grey areas of ICS security 
and the complexities faced by security workers. 
• We propose the notion of security workers as shadow 
warriors tackling these complexities and report on their 
habits, beliefs and strategies. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: first we summarise 
the method employed during the fieldwork including a summary 
of the individuals interviewed (Section 2). This is followed by a 
presentation of the key findings from our initial analysis (Section 
3). We then discuss the implications of these findings (Section 4) 
before presenting a brief overview of related work (Section 5) and 
concluding the paper (Section 6).  
2. FIELDWORK 
We have completed 25 interviews, each lasting approximately one 
hour, collected over three years of fieldwork. Interviewees were 
from manufacturing, oil and gas industries both in Italy and the 
UK. These informants were selected for their role within security 
in these organisations. Their availability was a result of a 
snowball sample guided by our theoretical interest in access to 
people able to describe workplace practices about security in ICS. 
Therefore, we interviewed Managers, IT Managers, Security 
Managers, Engineers and Vendors of cyber security systems (see 
Table 1 for details). Our aim was to gather a range of stakeholder 
insights into organisational practices.  
Table 1: Characteristics of 25 Informants 
N Role ICS Sector Organisation 
10 Engineers in 
IT 
Development of software for 
ICS: detecting, penetration 
test, mitigation, networks,  
Various companies 
3 Engineer Maintenance  Utility companies 
3 Security 
manager 
Security policy and team in 
organizations 
Utility companies 




Hidden market malware, 
post-event analysis, fixing 





penetration test in industry 
CEO of own 
company  
1 Engineer PLCs testing Power company 
1 Scholar Risk & safety analysis University 
1 Scholar ICS analysis University 
 
A series of five additional informal talks were conducted prior to 
these interviews in order to refine the interview questions. All the 
interviews were recorded, transcribed and coded for the analysis 
and supplemented with field notes collected during the interview 
process. The project received approval from our institution’s 
research ethics committee. 
Data analysis of interviews and fieldwork notes was carried out 
following a reflexive, grounded-theory approach focused on 
connecting concepts, emerging issues, labelling and commenting. 
We adopted a template analysis to assess the way that different 
stakeholders described their specific industry cyber security 
practices [16] following the framework of social construction in 
qualitative research [12]. Working with the templates we re-
analysed the excerpts to understand if saturation of labels was 
reached. Then concepts were connected following a reduced 
number of templates that helped us to describe the characteristics 
of security work practices. 
3. FINDINGS 
The complexity introduced by the increased connectivity of ICS 
became apparent during our fieldwork. Every time we tried to 
“follow” the informant’s description of his/her practices, we faced 
recurrent situations where professional boundaries, protocols and 
strategies used to manage security at the production level became 
blurred. This led us to the concept of a grey area – a description 
used by some informants to describe how organisational duty to 
provide security protocols and technical advice for all the staff did 
not sufficiently cover the multiplicity of situations that they 
actually had to resolve. The security workers often had to work in 
the shadows (following Morgan [20], we use the metaphor of 
“warriors”) often fighting with incomplete instructions or coming 
up against barriers posed by organisational boundaries or role 
descriptions. In the following findings, we provide some examples 
of these grey areas and highlight their impact on ICS security. 
This is followed by a discussion of the shadow warriors’ habits, 
beliefs and strategies regarding security.  
3.1.1 Grey area and top-down approach 
Informants described the complexity that occurs when 
organisations introduce a top-down approach to cyber security. 
The interviewees highlighted how management often request 
procedures that are not always applicable for dealing with 
everyday exceptions. Their accounts suggest that during any work 
day there are many situations and unexpected problems that need 
to be addressed. Security teams must therefore utilise disciplinary 
protocols, and rely on power delegated by the management to 
implement security controls. Nevertheless the accounts we 
collected show that their work and its implications are not easily 
understood by others. For example, a protocol may state that 
every person/item that enters a production plant must be detected 
and tracked. However, if a truck has to deliver a large number of 
parcels and props open a secured door then someone can enter 
undetected and untracked, hence potentially having physical 
access to information accessible via IT or SCADA workstations 
and HMIs (human-machine interfaces) for PLCs. In another 
example, if alarms are starting to sound excessively because of a 
routine maintenance program then staff may switch off the sound 
until the end of the day, without regard for the fact that such 
alarms may be the result of cyber security breaches. Alternatively, 
a valve may be replaced many times within a short period without 
anyone considering if the problem is the result of a cyber attack. 
Of course, if security staff remind personnel about how strictly 
they must observe these and other protocols then they are likely to 
receive a multitude of complaints from their colleagues about 
their integrity. So, sometimes they have to protect themselves 
from colleagues’ remarks and from the risk of poor interactions 
that result from strict security policies.  
3.1.2 Grey area and production’s complexity 
Some accounts collected from the informants reflected an image 
of the security team as a patrol continuously working in the 
shadow. As warriors, they develop internal codes to address 
unexpected situations. They fight everyday with the technologies, 
within the supply chain, as well as with employees in the different 
  
sectors, but mainly in the production lines. Moreover, they are 
also continuously in negotiation with the management. Their tasks 
are poorly understood by others in the organisation. For example, 
if an operator is dealing with a SCADA system connected to a 
PLC and to a physical element of the process, and the physical 
element has unusual damage, it may take a long time to 
understand that it could be affected by a remote attack. But if the 
shadow warriors start to require strict access permissions and 
login check to every PLC, the operators become upset – as this 
requires them to change their practices and habits. Other problems 
come from legacy systems that are poorly protected and 
everything, from the cyber security point of view, must be 
handled with great care, as often they neither have the 
computational capacity nor the hardware/software necessary to 
implement relevant security controls.  
3.1.3 Grey area and organisational knowledge 
The work of the security teams is often restricted due to lack of 
visibility of information from various parts of the organisation. 
Despite the fact that work in ICS organisations mostly involves 
managing “real” things, like documents, production machineries, 
buying and selling things, the shadow warriors often have to work 
between teams and technical areas. As such they have to prepare a 
secure environment through a complexity that is hidden and 
blurred as seen from outside. The overlaps between security and 
other parts of the organisation are often poorly understood. An 
informant (an engineer) involved in maintenance in a power 
company reflected on the work of the security team as follows: 
“They [security staff] tend to be a separate team, so they tend to do their 
own work, and I do my work. Yes, [I work in] physical security. I mean, 
there is an overlap, to our telemetry systems and that’s a bit of a grey area 
– no direction as to who looks after certain [equipment], so, sometimes 
you don’t know whether you should be touching it or not.” 
The situation is particularly acute at some peripheral sites where 
often technicians have a weak vision regarding security. In fact, if 
something unusual occurs within a production plant, it is simply 
considered ‘strange’ but often no further action is undertaken. 
Managing and implementing security in such situations requires 
contextual knowledge, responsibility and entitlement. More often 
than not, this requires an organisational effort and a 
communication commitment on part of the organisation. 
However, these efforts are not always strongly supported by the 
organisation and many aspects remain undefined.  
3.1.4 Staff avoid mandatory behaviour 
When security workers carry out assessments regarding possible 
attacks, and ask to perform any security testing which requires 
simple actions such as port scanning or switching off the PLC, the 
crew working with the [equipment] becomes (in the words of a 
security consultant) “crazy with fear”. They are concerned about 
the potential safety impact of any security testing and ask the 
security teams to leave them in peace and in a safe situation. 
These safety concerns are often not completely unfounded; for 
instance, a penetration test could bring down significant parts of 
the system. An engineer noted the following with regards to the 
gap in security perception between the security team and 
production engineers: 
“Well the system is working… Please don’t give us much stress about it! 
Don’t be so paranoid, please. It works!” 
The engineers we have interviewed tend not to have faith in “real 
life” testing. They just want to follow their aims, to show how 
efficient they are with respect to production targets. Another 
problem is the lack of good documentation of devices at 
peripheral sites.  
3.1.5 Shadow warriors: just workers among others 
Security staff, like any other, have particular competencies, but 
again like any other, they are “employees” with typical concerns 
about disciplinary action or monetary rewards, e.g., a bonus 
related to the number of alerts managed in a year as suggested by 
one of our informants. Or may be they are under evaluation for a 
new post in the company. Or, again, they could be tired because 
of low wages and great stress that they face in the workplace. A 
security consultant highlighted how security workers can at times 
be more interested in solving the problem rather analysing the root 
causes so as to not be seen as doing a poor job: 
“Once I have demonstrated that the temperature is coherent with what is 
compatible with these valves, then the question of what the cause is, if it 
isn’t the temperature, will arise in the mind of whoever is in front of me.”  
We have to be aware of the idea that to deal with cyber security, is 
like to deal with any other job. It increases the complexity to pay 
attention to the possible link between unusual events, which can 
occur during production and possible cyber attacks. Therefore, 
security staff, like any other employee, often try to configure their 
tasks as a normal activity to reproduce organisational practices 
and habits.  
3.2 The Shadow Warriors at Work 
We have identified a number of key traits that the shadow 
warriors tend to exhibit when dealing with cyber security in ICS. 
They trust in their habits, try to stick to their beliefs and they 
follow a range of strategies to manage their work in the grey area. 
3.2.1.1 Habits 
The shadow warriors’ habits are usually particular and help 
people involved in the security team to trust each other. As any 
organisational professional group they share practices, spaces, 
languages and a common labour culture. Warriors, from our 
findings, are highly motivated and are expected to be able to 
“protect” people from a wide range of situations. They must 
specialise in technological interventions, and are keen to adhere to 
international best practices when developing organisational 
protocols. They work (often behind the scenes) with vendors and 
technical consultants to improve security of the various hardware 
and software components deployed within the ICS. This enables 
them to achieve their security goals despite rigid organisational 
boundaries and lack of cooperation from others within the 
organisation. However, such “hidden work” further extends the 
grey area – in terms of a lack of visibility of security practices 
across the organisation. Asking about how communication can 
circulate between workers in a manufacturing company, an 
informant described how uncertain and untrained people may be:   
“[If] you have this security person, and his job is to understand these 
things, he might know that Stuxnet happened or that the German Steel 
Mill got hacked, he might know these things, but it sounds like that 
information is not disseminated to people on the ground either.”  
  
3.2.1.2 Beliefs 
As any warriors in history, shadow warriors believe that they are 
the only barrier, the last line of defence, against the enemy. They 
work with commitment and attempt to maintain security in the 
face of blurred boundaries and, at times, lack of resources and 
systemic documentation and communication across the 
organisation. An informant described how security can often be a 
handcrafted, solitary activity: 
“We still don’t have any internal protocols because, up until three years 
ago, I used to [do it all] by myself. Therefore, I would create a system, 
[and undo] it how I pleased. Now it is two people working together […] 
but there isn’t anything written.” 
As highlighted by other research in organisational studies [13], all 
organisations deal with uncertain areas. The shadow warriors 
develop a special expertise to work in this space. They know that 
it is difficult to defend against all potential attacks but, through the 
power to configure every gate access, they do their best to secure 
the systems in their charge.  
3.2.1.3 Strategies 
Shadow warriors follow a range of strategies to manage their 
work in the grey area. When dealing with ordinary employees 
such as engineers, technicians, etc. this often involves power 
relationships, e.g., declining requests for additional privileges on 
local workstations, or enforcing particular security policies, e.g., 
password strengths and change frequencies. For interactions with 
management, as an informant explained, it is not so much about 
highlighting potential risk of attacks, but instead stressing the 
point about the business loss: 
“But they [management] are not necessarily knocking on our door looking 
for solutions, but if we present issues, or issues that get close to their heart 
and they realise the danger to their operations, we would hope that they 
would react. You can’t submit the bill of how much a technological 
solution might cost; what you should present is the bill of the total amount 
if you don’t include certain things. In other words, how much would it 
cost you to implement a system and how much do you save […]? Even if 
this isn’t totally understood, we need to use a bit of psychology so that the 
negative evaluation of the cost turns upside down.” 
The above quote shows that shadow warriors build particular 
coping strategies to manage the complexity of their work and 
acquire resources to enable them to carry on their task of 
managing security in the grey area. However, as noted previously, 
such (hidden) strategies further extend the “greyness” surrounding 
security in ICS settings. 
4. DISCUSSION 
The findings herein help to describe how organisational 
complexity in ICS settings affects cyber security. Our analysis 
suggests that, there are few investments in organisation-wide 
communication of security issues and awareness and that, 
consistent with previous work [15], companies are mostly 
considering the failure-model analysis and a positivistic approach.  
Our findings also highlight that grey areas are crossroads of 
different professional interests and, within these, the organisations 
fail to work in a coherent manner. The fieldwork confirms that 
these places are a perfect environment for the shadow warriors. 
They follow a culture-based approach to organisational behaviour 
and work to become central to many internal policies. In doing so 
they act in contradictive relational fragmented ways [9, 10]. They 
use their knowledge of security issues and the danger posed by 
external attackers as differentiation tools to assess their 
relationships with other parts of the organisation and to maintain 
their relevance in the organisational labour divisions [7].  
5. RELATED WORK 
Ani et al. [14] propose three different organisational strategies to 
tackle cyber threats in ICS: technology-centred, process-centred 
and people-centred. However, these strategies are interconnected 
and often their complexities overlap. The original hierarchical 
vision – with clear division of labour, division of infrastructures 
and division of defence strategies – does not capture the real 
complexities [6, 7].  These systems are better represented as a 
continuum where at one end of the continuum there are 
mechanisms that tackle the problem through reliance on ICS 
security technologies and automated monitoring, while on the 
other are approaches focusing primarily on the human factor [4, 
5]. If the former suggest that we pay attention to the evolution of 
the technology and its ability to measure the risk of intrusion, the 
latter show that people who interact with complex infrastructures 
and environments make the difference in protecting business and 
production, as is the case for the shadow warriors. 
Cherdantseva et al. [15] suggest that most cyber security risk 
assessment methods for ICS are failure-oriented. They underline 
that a failure-oriented approach is not complete and highlight the 
need for a “positivist top-down perspective by identifying the 
elements and dependencies within a SCADA system that are 
required in order for a system to be operational, safe and secure” 
[15, p.22]. Unfortunately, such a positivistic top-down approach 
represents executives and senior management, middle managers, 
supervisors and workforce teams as differently involved in the 
process of security. In reality, they are in charge of many 
processes that can directly or indirectly affect the security of a 
plant. Despite this, security workers are usually tasked with 
providing security for all, regardless of the expectations of 
management, the complexity of technological systems or the non-
compliant behaviour of non-technical users. These processes are 
rife with challenges and tensions, which require expert navigation 
in undefined territories. One common answer to this problem has 
been the improvement of design processes and (again) the top-
down management of conflicts [25, 26]. Moreover, other 
researchers suggest that the answer should be mainly in the 
formation and use of strategic models and active monitoring [23, 
24]. This creates a no-man’s land, a shadow zone, apparently safe 
for business from potential attacks. However, we would stress that 
such territory lies between the complexities of technical expertise 
and social practices. Security staff often struggle to combine these 
two sides due to the strong division of labour by role that occurs 
within organisations [7]. The concept of shadow warriors 
describes the hidden but high stakes nature of the work that 
security personnel in ICS settings undertake. This label allows us 
to present some relevant issues, both on the technical side and on 
the social side, that affect security. 
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
We have presented initial insights into the complexities faced by 
security workers in ICS environments. Our study highlights that 
these shadow warriors should not be left alone to fight these 
complexities. In fact, organisations can improve the security and 
resilience of their ICS if the knowledge from these shadow 
warriors is properly elicited and put to good use in improving 
  
security practice across the organisation. Such a change will 
require a redefinition of the mission of security workers and 
indeed all employees to:  
1. Bring cyber security out of the shadows to promote the 
idea that it is everyone's responsibility. Some 
operations, however, must necessarily remain in the 
shadows because of the inherent secretive nature of 
security work.  
2. Organisations should enable their cyber security staff to 
operate less like warriors engaged in constant battles 
and instead support them to act more like officers 
engaged in community policing with the support and 
understanding of everyone around them.   
Our future work (currently in progress) involves a more detailed 
analysis of the qualitative data collected in this study. This work 
will look at highlighting specific best practices used by successful 
shadow warriors and their wider organisations in managing ICS 
security effectively. 
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